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Ripe Standing Vines and the Jurisprudential Tasting of
Matured Legal Wines—and Law & Bananas: Property
and Public Choice in the Permitting Process
Donald J. Kochan
ABSTRACT
From produce to wine, we only consume things when they are ready.
The courts are no different. That concept of “readiness” is how courts
address cases and controversies as well. Justiciability doctrines,
particularly ripeness, have a particularly important role in takings
challenges to permitting decisions. The courts largely hold that a single
permit denial does not give them enough information to evaluate whether
the denial is in violation of law. As a result of this jurisprudential reality,
regulators with discretion have an incentive to use their power to extract
rents from those that need their permission. Non-justiciability of permit
denials creates perverse incentives for regulators. This Article examines
that phenomenon.
I. INTRODUCTION
Grapes are planted, then pulled off vines, mashed, fermented, and
then converted to wines. But not all batches make it to the shelves.
Similarly, bananas can be green, yellow, or black, which changes their
character and suitability for consumption. Neither the grapes nor the
bananas start ready and neither always ends up being consumed. These
are stages in produce, but they also provide a useful analogy as to how
courts determine whether certain lawsuits are ripe for review — whether
they are ripe for the picking or dead on the vine. Judicial review in the
permitting process provides a very useful examination of these concepts,
where judicial decisions to consume cases mirror our personal decisions
of when and whether to buy that wine or eat that banana.
The banana example can provide a visual analogy. Under
justiciability doctrines (like the prudent shopping decision), a legal case
cannot be too green (not yet ripe), must be yellow (ripe), and cannot be
black (moot). The same principle can be seen in distinguishing when a
grape is not ready to be picked (not yet ripe for wine), perfect for
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fermenting into wine (ripe), or has wasted away into a raisin (moot).
Those are the realities of justiciability. Consider also the phrase, “No
wine is good before its time.”1 When are permitting decisions tested
sufficiently for jurisprudential tasting? This question pervades the
doctrines of justiciability, as well as the underlying doctrines
(constitutionally and prudentially) of standing generally, ripeness,
exhaustion, and mootness. Justiciability is ultimately a determination of
when a case is “fit” for review.
This Article goes beyond the discussion of when cases are justiciable
to whether the decision of “when” motivates governmental actors in
deciding to grant or deny permits in the land-use setting. It concludes
that the justiciability doctrines allow unilateral powers on the part of
government officials to make things “unfit” for review and insulated
from scrutiny, which creates perverse incentives in the permitting
process. This presents a positive analysis of the general workings of the
permitting process within the theories of political economy, analyzing
the interaction between jurisprudential principles and regulatory reality.
It invites empirical testing of the theories and assumptions presented to
gauge their validity and then suggest solutions, should the inefficiencies
and inequities of rent-seeking and rent-extraction prove accurate.
Laws now require individuals to receive governmental permission
for a large number of personal and economic activities. Astute
administrators recognize that there are costs associated with permitting
and the regulatory process. Perverse incentives can sometimes flow from
the power to grant or withhold such permission. As such, this Article
attempts to explain the incentives involved in the permitting process in
light of the insights of the public choice theory of regulation.
Part II describes the current state of the ripeness doctrine for
regulatory takings review. Part III presents a brief summary of public
choice theory. Part IV posits that because the ripeness doctrine decreases
the judiciary’s check over agency action, institutional biases granting
permits are formed. Although the theories developed here apply to all
“permission”-oriented activities in society, from obtaining a liquor
1. For this vineyard verse that is applicable to justiciability juice, see Michael Wilmington,
Many Film Directors Have Ties to the Ad World, CHI. TRIB ., Jan. 26, 1997, at 13 (“Orson Welles . . .
, memorably intoned, ‘We will sell no wine before its time.’”); Howard G. Goldberg, When is
‘Right’ Time for Wine?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1999, at 30 (“Graying wine lovers may remember
Orson Welles intoning ‘We will sell no wine before its time’ in a commercial for Paul Masson
wines.”); David Cay Johnston, Market Place; The Wine Maker Canandaigua is Riding High. But
Can It Continue?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1995, at 6 (“‘We will sell no wine before its time,’ Orson
Welles said in a memorable commercial for the mostly forgettable Paul Masson wines.”); Richard
Benke, Orson Welles, Film Genius, Entertainment Boy Wonder, B OSTON GLOBE, Oct. 11, 1985, at
25 (“[Welles] made . . . spots in which he made famous the phrase, ‘We will sell no wine before its
time.’”). To see one of the commercials for nostalgia’s sake, visit Dressing Room,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vaEeAcH0lFU (last visited Oct. 5, 2009).
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license to receiving a permit for constructing a house, and similar
ripeness standards apply for other challenges 2 including due process
claims, this Article will apply the theory by focusing on regulatory
takings claims in federal courts. Whether for good or bad, this Article
will demonstrate that justiciability hurdles have a significant impact in
the power differentials between those seeking permits and those with
discretionary power to grant or deny the permission sought.
II. RIPENESS
In addition to the “case or controversy” requirements of Article III of
the U.S. Constitution, a regulatory takings claim must overcome
prudential hurdles of ripeness before a court will adjudicate a permit
denial.3 Only a regulation that “goes too far” results in a taking under the
Fifth Amendment. 4 Thus, many takings claims are blocked by the
ripeness doctrine because “[a] court cannot determine whether a
regulation has gone ‘too far’ unless it knows how far the regulation
goes.”5 Ripeness doctrine has created a quagmire for many property
owners that fall prey to regulation and hope for judicial resolution in
suits against the government.
A few select cases developed the doctrine that has led to a brick wall
for the majority of individuals seeking access to courts under regulatory
takings claims. The way the ripeness doctrine has developed closes the
door to most aggrieved property owners in permitting situations. Justice
Kennedy summarized the basic doctrine in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island:
These cases stand for the important principle that a landowner may not
establish a taking before a land-use authority has the opportunity, using
its own reasonable procedures, to decide and explain the reach of a
challenged regulation. Under our ripeness rules a takings claim based
on a law or regulation which is alleged to go too far in burdening
property depends upon the landowner’s first having followed
reasonable and necessary steps to allow regulatory agencies to exercise
their full discretion in considering development plans for the property,
including the opportunity to grant any variances or waivers allowed by
law. As a general rule, until these ordinary processes have been

2. See infra Part IV.
3. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1984); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 559-62 (1992).
4. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (finding a Pennsylvania law
unconstitutional because it took away valid contractual rights owed to the defendant).
5. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 348 (1986).

52

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 24

followed the extent of the restriction on property is not known and a
regulatory taking has not yet been established.6

Palazzolo drew on a number of cases, several of which are described
below. These cases illustrate that regulators are largely insulated for
takings judicial review due to the ripeness hurdle. Knowing that their
actions are not immediately subject to judicial review could motivate
regulators to initially deny permit applications. The rational regulator,
under these standards, should be expected to use the coercive power of
required permission to extract something more from an applicant before
bestowing approval. Several cases set up this landowner quandary.
For example, Suitum v. Tahoe Planning Agency explained the
precedent on ripeness in regulatory takings cases as follows:
There are two independent prudential hurdles to a regulatory takings
claim brought against a state entity in federal court. . . . [A] plaintiff
must demonstrate that she has both received a “final decision regarding
the application of the [challenged] regulations to the property at issue”
from “the government entity charged with implementing the
regulations,” . . . and sought “compensation through the procedures the
State has provided for doing so,” . . . . The first requirement follows
from the principle that only a regulation that “goes too far,” . . . results
in a taking under the Fifth Amendment . . . . The second hurdle stems
from the Fifth Amendment’s proviso that only takings without “just
compensation” infringe that Amendment; “if a State provides an
adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, the property owner
cannot claim a violation of the Just Compensation Clause until it has
used the procedure and been denied just compensation . . . .”7

Suitum underscores the finality requirement that makes it difficult to
establish ripeness in regulatory takings cases.
In Agins v. City of Tiburon, landowners facing zoning ordinances
restricting the number of houses they could build on their property sued. 8
Because they had not sought approval for any particular development on
their land, however, the Supreme Court declined to reach the merits of
this claim. 9 In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n,

6. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 620–21 (2001); see also Tahoe-Sierra Pres.
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 339–40 (2002).
7. Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 733–34 (1997) (citations
omitted).
8. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 257-258 (1980), abrogated by Lingle v. Chevron
U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005) (overturned for point of law requiring a substantial state interest).
9. Id. at 257, 263.
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coal producers and landowners challenged the enactment of the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act as a taking of their property. 10
Hodel held that where the regulatory regime offers the possibility of a
variance from its facial requirements, a landowner must not only submit
a development plan but must also seek a variance to ripen his claim. 11
Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton
Bank, reaffirmed by Suitum,12 set the standard for ripeness review of
takings claims. 13 In Williamson, a developer’s plan to build a residential
complex was rejected by the local Planning Commission as inconsistent
with zoning ordinances and subdivision regulations. 14 The Court held
that a plaintiff must receive a final and conclusive determination from an
agency on the permissible use of the developer’s property before filing a
judicial proceeding. 15 Thus, some attempt to resort to the procedures for
obtaining variances is required to establish ripeness.
As the Court later indicated in MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo
County, a determination that one proposal is not permissible does not
conclusively resolve the issue of what is permissible. 16 In MacDonald, a
local Planning Commission rejected a developer’s subdivision plan as
inconsistent with the zoning regulations.17 MacDonald’s application of
the Williamson “final decision” requirement indicated that multiple
proposals or variance applications will sometimes be necessary for a
landowner’s case to ripen. Because “[r]ejection of exceedingly grandiose
development plans does not logically imply that less ambitious plans will
receive similarly unfavorable reviews,” 18 it cannot be said that every
denial is the conclusive and final word on the use of property.
The ripeness and final decision requirements established by these
cases severely limit the availability for review of permit denials. There
are some independent jurisdictional justifications for these rulings. This
Article, however, examines how these rulings contribute to potentially
disturbing regulatory behavior.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 273 (1981).
Id. at 297.
Suitum, 520 U.S. 725.
Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
Id. at 176–82.
Id. at 172–74, 186–94.
MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 351–353.
Id. at 343.
Id. at 353 n.9.
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III. THE PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY OF REGULATION19
Ultimately, these justiciability standards affect the incentives of
regulators when they hold the power over landowners seeking to take
actions within the discretion of regulators to permit or deny. When
justiciability hurdles exist to insulate regulatory decisions from review, it
will change the regulators’ behavior. Insights from public choice theory
explain why.
Public choice theory—also known as the interest-group or economic
theory—of legislation can explain governmental behavior in a variety of
circumstances. Legislation or regulatory action, including the receipt of
governmental “permission” to act, is a saleable commodity. 20 Supply and
demand principles operate for legislation and regulation in much the
same way as with any other economic good. Permission or legislative
protection passes to those that gain the greatest value from it—i.e., those
that are willing to pay the most for it—independent of any concerns for
overall social welfare.21 As Richard Posner describes it, “The ‘interest
group’ theory asserts that legislation is a good demanded and supplied
much as other goods, so that legislative protection flows to those groups
that derive the greatest value from it, regardless of overall social
welfare.”22 This is in direct contrast to the long-standing analysis of the
production of legislation or regulation as being in the “public interest.” 23
Interest groups—whether they are single individuals or
organizations—have an incentive to use available means to influence
governmental outcomes. The modes of influence could consist of
“political support, promises of future favors, outright bribes, and
whatever else politicians value,” 24 including honoraria for speaking
19. The majority of this section draws from a previous article the author published which
explored applying public choice theory to public use principles of property law. See Donald J.
Kochan, “Public Use” and the Independent Judiciary: Condemnation in an Interest-Group
Perspective, 3 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 49, 79–84 (1998).
20. See George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI.
3 (1971); Richard Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335
(1974); JAMES BUCHANAN ET AL., TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY (1980);
Daniel A. Farber & Philip Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX L. REV. 873 (1987);
Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339–71 (1988).
21. Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution,
49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 265 (1982). Put differently, “interest group theory treats statutes as
commodities that are purchased by particular interest groups or coalitions of interest groups that
outbid and outmaneuver competing interest groups.” Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting PublicRegarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 223, 227 (1986) [hereinafter, Macey, Public-Regarding].
22. Posner, supra note 21, at 265.
23. See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & G ORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT
(1971); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION (1991).
24. Macey, Public-Regarding, supra note 21, at 228. To obtain further currency, politicians
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engagements or promises of employment (in lobbying or elsewhere) after
retirement25 traded for governmental action or inaction beneficial to the
interest group. Even if an individual legislator will not receive a direct
benefit from an interest group, vote-trading may motivate a rational
legislator.26
Public choice theory generally provides a mechanism to predict all
governmental actions broadly understood—including the permitting
process, legislative acts, administrative agency actions, and executive
actions. Indeed, the theory is also not limited to the affirmative act of
legislation. Interest groups may often bargain to block legislation or to
receive regulatory forbearance.27
Interest groups—including both those in favor of and opposed to
land use regulation—seek to use the government to obtain more
favorable prices than would be available under competitive market
conditions.28 Public choice theory posits that individuals are motivated to
escape market prices for the accomplishment of their desires through a
process of “rent-seeking”29—expending resources to obtain favors from
government, which include direct subsidies or benefits or regulations to
harm a competitor.
Rent-seeking is successful because legislators are able to concentrate
benefits on a particular interest group while normally dispersing the costs
on the general public as taxpayers. The incentive structure that results
explains the success of rent-seeking behavior.30 Interest groups have an
incentive to obtain the legislation by granting special favors to legislators
so long as the cost of the investment does not exceed the benefit they will
obtain. When groups “enjoy lower information and transaction costs than
others, they will succeed in obtaining wealth transfers to themselves at
the expense of other groups. These differential costs are the sine qua non
of rent-seeking.”31 It is very simple—if you can satisfy your preferences
by buying from Wal-Mart at a lower cost than Saks Fifth Avenue, you
will choose Wal-Mart. This differential between the market manufacturer
also have an incentive to act as brokers of information for interest groups by “identifying and
helping enact legislation that transfers wealth from groups with high information and transaction
costs to groups with low information and transaction costs.” Id. at 230.
25. Gregg Easterbrook, What’s Wrong with Congress? Before Congress Can Lead the
Nation, It Must Be Able to Lead Itself, 254 ATLANTIC 57, 70–72 (Dec. 1984).
26. See William H. Riker & Steven J. Brams, The Paradox of Vote Trading, 67 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 1235, 1236 (1973) (describing the incentives for legislators to engage in vote-trading).
27. See generally Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic
Theory of Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1987).
28. See generally Farber & Frickey, supra note 20.
29. Id.
30. For a general discussion of the incentive structure resulting from concentrated benefits
and dispersed costs, see Macey, Public-Regarding, supra note 21, at 229.
31. Id.
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of a commodity and a governmental manufacturer of a commodity is
displayed in Table 1, illustrating the “savings” or “rent” that can be
obtained by tapping into governmental commodities.

TABLE 1: THE RENT-SEEKING DIFFERENTIAL
M ________________________________________________
Rent
G _________________________________________________
M = Market Price to Achieve Desired Result
G = Price to Achieve Desired Result through Legislation (broadly
defined)

Rent-seeking means that so long as a preference can be satisfied by
investing in a governmental outcome at a lower price than a marketnegotiated price (servitudes, for example), the rational economic
neighbor or interest group or other party will seek to use the coercive
governmental power. Basically, it is about saving money—I could pay
my neighbor to agree not to build a deck or I could spend less and get the
municipality to ban it.
Thus, in the permitting process, interest groups work to obtain or
oppose regulations by lobbying for either a grant or denial of a permit.
And the price of regulation is directly proportional to the durability of the
agency’s action. William Landes and Richard Posner contend that
judicial enforcement of interest-group bargains is a critical factor in
lending such durability.32 As such, a high ripeness hurdle created
prudentially by the courts insulates many permit denials from
invalidation, thereby increasing the price those opposed to development
will be willing to pay for securing such a denial. 33 There are several
incentives for interest groups to engage in rent-seeking, the combination
of which makes rent-seeking successful.
Fighting city hall is costly, and seldom cost-efficient for any
particular piece of special interest legislation. That is the brilliance that
makes it successful for interest groups. The costs are widely dispersed;
thus, fighting any one piece of legislation or regulation is likely to bring
only a small benefit to a taxpayer through the elimination of that
governmental action’s portion of his tax obligation. The economically

32. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an InterestGroup Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975).
33. See infra Part IV.

49]

JUSTICIABILITY IN THE PERMITTING PROCESS

57

rational taxpayer will have little incentive to combat any one piece of
legislation.34
Information costs also play a pivotal role in interest group success.
The information costs incurred to discover the impact of any issue on the
taxpayer are high, thereby deterring him from identifying his interests in
the first place. Any individual willing to pay the information and
transaction costs associated with fighting legislation would also be
required to share the benefit (the absence of legislation) with everyone. 35
Known as the “free-rider” problem, this scenario makes it irrational for
most individuals to incur the costs of fighting alone. 36 Similarly situated
individuals are hard to identify, and combined with collective action
problems, it is too difficult to share the cost. 37 Thus, there will be little
incentive for affected persons to come together to fight legislation or
regulation, especially in light of the low prospects for success when
facing more organized, pre-existing coalitions.38
Interest groups can also control the flow of information better than
your lone citizen, especially on more complex issues, thereby
encouraging positive reaction to their agendas in legislatures and to the
electorate. 39 This gives them a competitive advantage for their agenda.
The special interest is likely to have a larger influence in the political
process and thereby able to offer more to legislators. As Daniel Farber
recognized, “All things being equal, it probably is still true that the
dispossessed [property owners] are disadvantaged by the one-shot nature
of their involvement. Thus, relative to other concentrated groups (such as
the construction firms that may support government construction), they
may have less clout . . . .”40

34. See MICHAEL T. HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS: A THEORY OF POLITICAL
MARKETS 69–70 (Rutgers University Press 1981). Hayes explains that “[m]embers of the mass
public will generally find it irrational to obtain the information necessary to identify their interests
on any given issue and moreover will be ill equipped to interpret any information they do obtain.”
Id.
35. Similarly, Olson illustrates why laws that benefit the people in general are unlikely to be
passed because of classic free-rider problems. See MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF
NATIONS : ECONOMIC GROWTH, STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES 41–47 (1982).
36. ROBERT MC CORMICK & ROBERT TOLLISON, POLITICIANS, LEGISLATION, AND THE
ECONOMY: AN I NQUIRY INTO THE INTEREST-GROUP THEORY OF G OVERNMENT 17 (1981).
37. See id. at 18.
38. As Macey explains, “Pre-existing coalitions and groups of allied individuals will be more
effective than dispersed individuals in obtaining transfers of wealth from society as a whole to
themselves.” Macey, Public-Regarding, supra note 21, at 229.
39. See NORMAN ORNSTEIN & SHIRLEY ELDER, INTEREST GROUPS, LOBBYING AND
POLICYMAKING 75-76 (Robert L. Peabody ed., 1978); GRAHAM K. WILSON, INTEREST GROUPS IN
THE UNITED STATES 113-14 (Clarendon Press 1981); Easterbrook, supra note 25, at 70.
40. Daniel Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 279, 290
(1992).
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When justiciability hurdles make it difficult to challenge decisions, 41
repeat players and those with greater influence can win against the lone
landowner in permitting decisions. Legislators and interest groups have
incentives to engage in activities that make their actions more difficult to
discover and have an incentive to cloud their actions in some public
interest.42 An individual landowner is unlikely to influence a politician’s
decision or his electoral chances, for “the probability that a typical voter
will change the outcome of the election is vanishingly small.” 43
Investing and competing for the creation or defeat of legislation or
regulation produces nothing but a legislative or regulatory outcome.
These actions make no independent economic contribution to society. 44
In addition to being inefficient and unproductive, the redistributive
nature of rent-seeking behavior has been regarded as immoral. 45 Rules
are not crafted in the public interest but are instead designed to benefit a
particular interest, a benefit that interest could not have obtained in a
competitive (and efficient) market. As Jonathan R. Macey states, the
rent-seeking model illustrates that “government will enact laws that
reduce societal wealth and economic efficiency in order to benefit
[specific] economic groups.”46
Rent-seeking leads to an inefficient misallocation of resources in
society.47 It creates “deadweight losses,” both as a result of the
unproductive expenditures to create legislation48 and the increased costs
to “consumers” as a result of the rents created. 49 Moreover, spending to
obtain or defeat legislation is diverted away from more productive
expenditures. 50 Mancur Olson describes the inefficient consequences:

41. See supra Part I.
42. Macey, Public-Regarding, supra note 21, at 232.
43. OLSON, supra note 35, at 26.
44. Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807,
812 (1975); William P. Rogerson, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation: A Game-Theoretic
Analysis, 13 BELL J. ECON. 391 (1982).
45. See generally FRIEDRICH A. H AYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944) (providing an indepth analysis of the problems from rent seeking).
46. Macey, Public-Regarding, supra note 21, at 230.
47. See, e.g., Paul J. Stancil, Assessing Interest Groups: A Playing Field Approach, 29
CARDOZO L. REV. 1273, 1288 (2008) (discussing several categories of economic losses associated
with rent-seeking behavior).
48. See Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J.
224, 228–30 (1967); Peter H. Aranson, Theories of Economic Regulation: From Clarity to
Confusion, 6 J.L. & POL. 247, 270–72 (1990).
49. Tullock, supra note 48, at 225.
50. Alm describes the necessity for even those in unregulated industries to expend resources
to influence or block legislation. See James Alm, The Welfare Cost of the Underground Economy, 23
ECON. INQUIRY 243, 243 n.1 (1985).
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First, “special-interest organizations and collusions reduce efficiency
and aggregate income in the societies in which they operate and make
political life more divisive.” Second, interest group coalitions
organized to effect wealth transfers “slow down a society’s capacity to
adopt new technologies and to reallocate resources in response to
changing conditions and thereby reduce the rate of economic growth.”
Finally, distributional coalitions increase “the complexity of regulation,
the role of government, and the complexity of understanding,” thereby
retarding the social evolution of a society and raising the costs of all
forms of economic activity.51

All of these reasons illustrate that limiting rent-seeking is desirable as a
means for both increasing growth and limiting redistributive effects in
the permitting process.
Interest groups can seek regulations to make it too expensive for
their competitor to act. For example, consider you have a patent on a
cleaner motor than your competitor. It is rational to ask the EPA to
impose more stringent clean air regulations that only your firm can meet.
The higher prices to competitors that result are called “economic rents.”
Similarly, a market participant may seek to obtain goods (e.g.,
environmental preservation) directly from the government at a lower cost
than they might otherwise need to pay on the open market. Interest
groups not only seek out affirmative acts by government officials, but
may often bargain to block legislation or to receive regulatory
forbearance. 52
Given all of this background theory, the rational regulator, therefore,
has an incentive to engage in rent-extraction—a type of extortion in
which negative regulatory actions are threatened to occur unless the
regulator receives a payment or positive regulatory action is conditioned
upon a payment. The power to deny includes the power to place
conditions on approvals. The perverse incentives associated with that
power are amplified when regulatory decisions can evade judicial
review. Much of this insulation from judicial review relies on the level of
discretionary power. The next Part will apply the principles of public
choice theory specifically to the permitting process.

51. Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice
Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. REV. 471, 479–80 (1988) (quoting
OLSON, supra note 35, at 74).
52. Id.
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY FOR THE
PERMITTING PROCESS
When something is prohibited unless permitted and discretion and
standards are sufficiently loose, regulators have a coercive monopoly
power over permit applicants. As the popular adage states, with great
power comes great responsibility, but with great discretion also comes
great power—especially where there is a hurdle to a judicial check on
that power.
Under Suitum, the Court recognized that when an agency is vested
with a high degree of discretion, 53 an attribute “characteristically
possessed by land-use boards” and other permitting agencies, it becomes
increasingly difficult to prove that the agency will never accept an
alternative proposal.54 If the agency would accept an alternative proposal,
no regulatory taking has occurred because the regulation has not gone
too far—i.e., it has not denied the landowner of any economically viable
use of his land. Thus, the ripeness doctrine prevents review and allows
the agency broad powers to deny a permit or variance application
without consequence. In fact, the Court recognized in MacDonald that
“local agencies charged with administering regulations governing
property development are singularly flexible institutions; what they take
with the one hand they may give back with the other.” 55
This is precisely the type of control that facilitates rent-extraction
opportunities. Consequently, there are a number of reasons to predict that
an agency will favor denials precisely because their non-final nature
presents opportunities not available from granting permits. When
discretion to deny exists and is insulated from challenge, the rational
regulator should see an opportunity to ask for something extra because
the applicant is at the regulator’s mercy.
First, the permitting system allows agencies to extract two types of
payments. We assume that A, the applicant, will make a payment with
his initial application to obtain the permit. Next, competitor (C) will
make payments to the agency (G) to facilitate a denial. The ability for A
to reapply decreases the durability of that denial, so it decreases the
amount C will pay (conversely, the amount G, the regulator, can extract).
After the initial denial, G can hold out the possibility of
reapplication. And because the initial denial is not ripe for review by the
courts, reapplication may become A’s only option. This means that G can
extract payments from both C and A again. The process might continue

53. Suitum, 520 U.S. at 733–35.
54. Id. at 738.
55. MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 350.
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perpetually so long as both C and A are willing to pay to play, or at least
until the issue becomes ripe for review. Of course, even then the process
might continue if A has a greater likelihood of receiving the permit from
the agency than receiving a ruling invalidating the agency’s action.
Multiple payments are likely to be in an agency official’s best
interest. I am not limiting myself to an outright bribe situation, but
instead to all the things of value that may be in the interest of the
regulator or legislator to procure from his benefactors, as discussed
above. Whereas a legislator may fear losing an election and will try to
make a more durable commitment to obtain as large a payment in the
first instance as possible, agency officials often have career positions and
will be net winners by promoting several smaller payments over time
rather than receiving one larger initial payment. Additionally, the interest
group’s initial payment may be larger than expected. Although the ability
to reapply decreases the durability of the initial deal, a strong ripeness
doctrine means that C need not worry about a judiciary upsetting the
durability of the initial denial.
A high ripeness hurdle also uniquely affects G’s willingness to
engage in a deal. The hurdle diminishes one of the functions of the
compensation component of the takings clause. G has little leverage
when he is more likely to be subject to a compensation obligation from a
denial. Where there is a risk of a requirement to pay compensation, it at
least marginally increases the political liability to government officials
when engaging in rent-seeking. The taxpayers, although dispersed, must
pay if a taking is found and the award is likely to be more transparent.
But when an official’s decision cannot be challenged because it is not
ripe, the merits are not reached, compensation will not be paid, and their
decision can elude transparency, then rent-extraction opportunities
increase. 56
Also supporting the prediction that an agency will favor denials is
the relative bargaining power of the typical parties in land-use
permitting. The special interest is likely to have a larger influence in the
political process, because unlike the landowner, the interest group is
probably a repeat player in the political process and thereby able to offer
more to legislators.57 The benefits offered, the influence gained, and the
mutual rewards increase exponentially in the repeat player game. 58
Property owners are burdened by their limited involvement with the
regulators relative to other concentrated groups with more clout, such as
56. See supra Part I.
57. See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 122
(2001) (“Sophisticated ‘repeat players’ in the United States often can avoid the expense and
unpredictability of adversarial legalism . . . .”).
58. Id.
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environmental groups, the historical preservation lobby, or other
supporters of land-use regulation.
Rent-seeking usually works because the activity can use the
legislative or regulatory process to concentrate benefits on selected
interest groups and disperse costs among the general public—a vehicle
that manipulates the transparency of the transaction and insulates those
that govern from accountability due to the dilution effect where affected
individuals have little incentive to challenge the nature of that legislative
or regulatory transaction. Although the denial of a land use permit
concentrates a cost on an individual landowner and his information costs
in discovering the impact of the regulation are low, there is little
incentive in the individualized permitting process for others to join in his
effort to obtain a permit or variance. Moreover, the applicant faces the
repeat-players who are not only more organized in their opposition but
are also able to offer the regulator more. As a result, the economically
rational regulator is likely to be more responsive to the lobby opposing a
permit. For example, if a regulator too often grants variances to a specific
land-use regulation, the durability of future regulations will be
questioned. Thus, the price an interest-group seeking to obtain another
regulation in the future is willing to pay for that regulation is lowered
due to the decreased confidence that the regulation will be applied to
reach that interest’s goals.
Finally, an agency is likely to exhibit the self-perpetuating
tendencies exhibited in bureaucracies—i.e., an incentive for the agency
to justify its existence and growth. If all applications are granted, the
perception is that very little “regulating” is occurring and it becomes
difficult to justify the agency’s existence.59 When a denial allows another
application, the agency creates more work for itself. An initial permit
approval gives it only one job with relation to that property, plan, etc.
However, a denial, even if everyone does not reapply, creates additional
work. It makes sense for the agency, even if it plans to grant the permit,
to at least require some changes in a proposal.
Nonetheless, permit applications do get approved. Some activities
are too clearly permissible under the regulations to deny them without
exposing interest-group politics. Moreover, sometimes it will be of only
marginal interest for the anti-development lobby to oppose a permit.
Thus, an applicant may outbid the opposing interest group. Furthermore,
the development lobbies are somewhat influential, although not as much
so for the simple, unconnected landowner. Because of these occurrences,
59. See generally WILLIAM N ISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
(1971) (arguing that bureaucracies maximize their budgets); GEORGE C. R OCHE, AMERICA BY THE
THROAT: THE STRANGLEHOLD OF FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY (1983); LUDWIG VON MISES,
BUREAUCRACY (1944).
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too many denials may also discourage initial applicants. G will take this
into account. If any payments are to flow to G from the potential
applicants, they must believe there is at least a reasonable chance of
success.60 Similarly, the interest-groups opposing a permit must believe
there is some risk that an application to which they are opposed will be
granted. If there is not, there will be little incentive to make a payment to
G when the same result will be obtained absent any payment. For this
reason, it is in G’s long-term interest to hold out the possibility of harm
to C’s interest by granting some permits.
V. CONCLUSION
Legal bananas must be ripe for eating and legal wines must be
matured to drinkable quality before the courts will indulge in their
consumption. Justiciability doctrines serve a very important purpose, but
we must at least consider that their effects on review of governmental
decisions affect the decision-making structure. When a regulator can
deny a permit, for example, knowing the decision will not be ripe for
review, it is irrational to grant that permit if she still has the ability to
exact something without liability.
Ripeness standards serve as a valuable gate-keeping tool for the
resolution of permitting disputes but also have developed in a manner to
insulate regulators from accountability for their decisions. As such,
public-choice theories predict that this places an enormous amount of
power in the hands of those empowered with the discretion to permit or
deny certain activities. The ability to respond with a “maybe not this
plan, but maybe another—come back and see us” provides a regulator
enough power and ability to prohibit many landowners from receiving
judicial review. With the legal standards on ripeness, and the ability to
control and extract, it would be irrational for any regulator not to use
those powers. Recognition of that reality will help us reexamine
discretionary power and jurisprudential controls.
This Article presents only a positive analysis and theory. Empirical
testing of the theories and assumptions presented is necessary before any
confident conclusions can be drawn as to the validity of these
hypotheses. Should these theories prove accurate, however, further
research into solutions is also appropriate given the well-documented
literature indicating the inefficiencies and inequities of rent-seeking and
rent-extraction. For example, the Court in Suitum was encouraged to
adopt a rule holding that a single variance application is sufficient to

60. The same is true with regard to re-applicants in order to induce subsequent applications.
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make a claim ripe, but it declined to do so. 61 However, even if such a rule
were adopted, only the ripeness hurdle would be lowered while the
difficult task of establishing a taking of private property under the
current jurisprudence would remain. Justiciability doctrines keep green
legal bananas and insufficiently-aged legal wines away from the bench,
but the consequences they create for discretionary authority of the
regulatory state and those that are regulated should be understood.

61. Suitum, 520 U.S. at 739.

